Support

The ability to support a point in the line is paramount for a commanding general. Either on defense or offense to be able to move troops quickly to a specific point can be the difference between victory or defeat. For the general on the defensive that support can come in the form of interior lines. By having a formation whose ends are close to each other, that general will have an easier time moving troops from one area to a threatened one quickly because his soldiers will have a shorter distance to travel. Gettysburg and the famous fishhook offer an excellent example of a commander using interior lines to support his overall defense. On July 2nd at around 3:30 The Army of Northern Virginia under command of General Robert E. Lee began their assault on Union General George Gordon Meade’s left flank. Lee’s plan was to attack in echelon that is, to attack from right to left. In this case Hood’s division was to threaten Meade far right then as Meade moved troops from other areas of his line to stop Hood; subsequent attack formations would come across the weakened area caused by Meade pulling troops to stop Hood. That brigade would achieve the breakthrough and the battle would be won. At least that was the theory thousands of confederates worked for on that muggy July day. As Longstreet’s troops smashed into federals at the rocky hills and Wheatfield, General Meade found himself having to pull men from his center and far right, areas not at that moment under attack. He was able to blunt the attacks of Hood and later McLaws in the Devil’s Den and Wheatfield. Pulling guns and men from other areas stopped the confederate assault across the Trostle Farm and when A.R. Wright’s Georgians broke through center of federal line, it was reinforcements from the other areas of Meade’s army that eventually stopped them. Interior lines enabled General Meade to move his troops to threatened areas of his defense thus stopping Lee’s army from achieving the victory they fought so hard to achieve. As for General Lee, while Meade enjoyed an interior line, he was spread out over a much longer front thus he was unable to quickly pull troops to support successes like the one achieved by A.R. Wright. Unsupported those Georgians were forced to give up the cannons they had captured and the ground they had secured. The sun set on the Georgians retreating across the Codori Farm, land that would be fought over again on July 3rd. For lack of support Lee was unable to take advantage of the breach on the 2nd which forced him to try again the next day. Another example of interior lines saving an army from destruction occurred on September 17th of 1862. The Army of Northern Virginia, 40,000 plus men, set up in a line very similar to the famous Fishhook of Gettysburg: Lee’s left anchored on Nichodemus Heights/Potomac River and his right on the Antietam Creek. From predawn until around 5:30 pm Lee’s greyclads fended off terrific assaults from an opponent larger, healthier and better armed. As Hooker then Mansfield attacked his left, Lee, thanks to interior lines, was able to bring troops stationed on his center and right into the fight for the cornfield. As McClellan’s assault shifted to the center, Lee again was able to move troops into the threatened area quickly thanks to the shortened distance between right and left. Meade and Lee were able to maintain their front because they had the ability to move troops to threatened areas quickly. The fishhook line used by Meade at Gettysburg can also be found at Antietam, Chickamauga, Franklin, Chancellorsville and other battlefields. Meade, Lee, Schofield survived held their position in part thanks to interior lines. Hooker nearly lost his army because he did not.