ARTILLERY

Artillery is a support weapon, providing more muscle to a defensive front and disruptive fire for an offensive movement. Defensively artillery can slow the impetus of an advance before it gets to the works. On July 3rd, at Gettysburg, Confederate infantry suffered nearly 500 artillery inflicted casualties before they even stepped off for their attack to the Codori Farm. Union batteries had the luxury of converging fire- fire converging on a central point. Their guns spread across over a long front were able to concentrate on one small area thus causing traumatic casualties on the assaulting confederate formations. Meanwhile the confederate artillery fire was forced to diverge, spread out its fire; counter battery fire against union guns on Little Round Top and other locations as well as trying to clear out the union forces at the copse of trees. At Chancellorsville on May 3rd Robert E. Lee, once he occupied Hazel Grove, he was able to have his guns all fire on a small space around the Chancellor House thus forcing Hooker to retire. At Malvern Hill union guns poured such a destructive, converging, fire that the confederate advance failed before it really started. When using artillery the general of the Civil War wanted to use his guns to support his attack or defense. Converging fire helped, diverging fire did not. S.D Lee’s battalion on the rise near the Dunker Church or cannon on Little Round Top, the location of a battery helps explain their role in the battle.

Support

The ability to support a point in the line is paramount for a commanding general. Either on defense or offense to be able to move troops quickly to a specific point can be the difference between victory or defeat. For the general on the defensive that support can come in the form of interior lines. By having a formation whose ends are close to each other, that general will have an easier time moving troops from one area to a threatened one quickly because his soldiers will have a shorter distance to travel. Gettysburg and the famous fishhook offer an excellent example of a commander using interior lines to support his overall defense. On July 2nd at around 3:30 The Army of Northern Virginia under command of General Robert E. Lee began their assault on Union General George Gordon Meade’s left flank. Lee’s plan was to attack in echelon that is, to attack from right to left. In this case Hood’s division was to threaten Meade far right then as Meade moved troops from other areas of his line to stop Hood; subsequent attack formations would come across the weakened area caused by Meade pulling troops to stop Hood. That brigade would achieve the breakthrough and the battle would be won. At least that was the theory thousands of confederates worked for on that muggy July day. As Longstreet’s troops smashed into federals at the rocky hills and Wheatfield, General Meade found himself having to pull men from his center and far right, areas not at that moment under attack. He was able to blunt the attacks of Hood and later McLaws in the Devil’s Den and Wheatfield. Pulling guns and men from other areas stopped the confederate assault across the Trostle Farm and when A.R. Wright’s Georgians broke through center of federal line, it was reinforcements from the other areas of Meade’s army that eventually stopped them. Interior lines enabled General Meade to move his troops to threatened areas of his defense thus stopping Lee’s army from achieving the victory they fought so hard to achieve. As for General Lee, while Meade enjoyed an interior line, he was spread out over a much longer front thus he was unable to quickly pull troops to support successes like the one achieved by A.R. Wright. Unsupported those Georgians were forced to give up the cannons they had captured and the ground they had secured. The sun set on the Georgians retreating across the Codori Farm, land that would be fought over again on July 3rd. For lack of support Lee was unable to take advantage of the breach on the 2nd which forced him to try again the next day. Another example of interior lines saving an army from destruction occurred on September 17th of 1862. The Army of Northern Virginia, 40,000 plus men, set up in a line very similar to the famous Fishhook of Gettysburg: Lee’s left anchored on Nichodemus Heights/Potomac River and his right on the Antietam Creek. From predawn until around 5:30 pm Lee’s greyclads fended off terrific assaults from an opponent larger, healthier and better armed. As Hooker then Mansfield attacked his left, Lee, thanks to interior lines, was able to bring troops stationed on his center and right into the fight for the cornfield. As McClellan’s assault shifted to the center, Lee again was able to move troops into the threatened area quickly thanks to the shortened distance between right and left. Meade and Lee were able to maintain their front because they had the ability to move troops to threatened areas quickly. The fishhook line used by Meade at Gettysburg can also be found at Antietam, Chickamauga, Franklin, Chancellorsville and other battlefields. Meade, Lee, Schofield survived held their position in part thanks to interior lines. Hooker nearly lost his army because he did not.

NO GAPS

Once a defensive general has made sure his flanks are secured he next needs to make sure there are no breaks in his line. A linear formation can be broken at the gaps. Take that principal to a defensive line, contiguous and the line becomes almost impenetrable, a gap and an attacking force can breach that line exposing two flanks- one on each side of the break. Have a break and you have a breach. At the battle of Fredericksburg union General George Gordon Meade broke through a portion of the confederate line in an area not properly defended by Stonewall Jackson’s troops. Jackson was saved by local support and Meade failed for a lack of support. At Chickamauga on September 20th 1863 a gap broke the back of an army. General Rosecrans laid out his defensive position in a line from Snodgrass Hill on his left to Viniard’s Field on his right. All was well until Roscrans received some information on a supposed gap on his left. To correct the perceived error he ordered General Wood to slide his division left to close the gap which did not exist. General Wood followed orders for reasons beyond the scope of the article and in doing so opened up a gap behind the Brotherton Cabin, smack dab in the center of the union line. Historical irony, in front of the Brotherton Cabin lay three full confederate division led by General James Longstreet. The confederate attack split the union line initiating the worse defeat of a large federal army anywhere during the Civil War. The defense at Cold Harbor, Kennesaw, and many other battles avoided gaps thus avoided the same humiliating defeat Rosecrans’s army suffered in 1863.

anchoring the flank

ANCHOR THE FLANKS The strength of a Civil War battle line is its front. The linear formation focuses all of the energies of a regiment to its front where the musket can send volumes of lead onto an enemy force. The weak area is its flank where the formation does not make it is easy to bring firepower to bear. Where as a company of fifty privates can fire their full compliment of muskets in front, if attacked on the flank, the best they could do is fire two muskets unless the formation moves, a slow and awkward movement especially if under fire. Knowing the weakness of a linear formation is on its flanks, generals on the defensive worked to protect them while attacking generals worked to take advantage them. On November 30, 1864 General James Schofield and his army of 27,000 union men peered over well developed entrenchments, watching John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee form for a frontal assault on their positions. Schofield had secured his flanks around Franklin Tennessee by planting them on the banks of the Harpeth River thus denying Hood the ability to attack his flanks. Eager for a victory Hood decided on a frontal assault, a decision history well knows the result- over 6,000 confederate casualties. For the defending general anchoring a flank could be done in a number of ways. Schofield had the Harpeth River to anchor to, Robert E. Lee at Antietam had the Potomac River and the Antietam Creek to protect his flanks, and General Buckner had the Tennessee River to protect his flanks at Fort Donelson. Anything that would slow and a flank attack would give time for an army to redeploy itself: bodies of water, hills, swamps, or sometimes forests to protect themselves from flank attack. If a natural barrier was not available a defending general would refuse his flank, that is to have troops form at a right angle to his line thus providing protection. Chancellorsville, 3:00pm May 2nd 1863 three divisions of Stonewall Jackson’s corps of 30,000 men face east waiting for the sound of two signal guns. Meanwhile union soldiers of O.O. Howard’s Eleventh Corps face south, the men taking off their shoes, frying salt pork and boiling coffee while two fellow regiments refuse their Western flank. The sound of the two confederate cannons fired in quick secession began a rush and a shout of an attack that all but destroys two federal corps, smashing most of General Hooker’s line. If not for darkness the result of Hooker not protecting his flank could have been catastrophic for the union. The next day Hooker did redeploy his army with it flanks securely anchored on the Rappahannock River forcing Lee into a series of costly frontal assaults.

A new Civil War Seriel: Tactics of the CW

I've been teaching a course on the Civil War for years now and in that class I spend a day talking about how battles were fought, or the basic tactics used on the battlefields of Virginia, Tennessee and the lot. My students ( teachers) seemed to have enjoyed the lecture and have said it helped them understand the reasons why battles were fought. I've typed up my notes into something I hope you find interesting. I'll submit a section whenever I get it written. SECTION ONE: INTRO When the boys of ‘61 began to learn the rudiments of drill one of the first things they learned how to do was to stand in two ranks; men shoulder to shoulder two deep was considered the optimal use of manpower. The slow loading of a musket, 20-30 seconds per round, forced military minds to find a way to pack in as many men per foot as possible while still offering the potential for movement. A linear formation of two ranks of men 13” between each rank proved the optimal design. This position allowed for the potential to put a fierce volume of fire downrange. This formation however often proved itself unwieldy, tough to move about quickly, and potentially vulnerable. Whether defending or attacking, the generals who paid head to the strengths and weaknesses of the linear formation tended to be successful while those who could not or did not often keep in mind and action chemistry of the formation met with failure. The rolling fields of Gettysburg or the earthen mounds of Petersburg, the fields of battle throughout the Civil War were fought over by generals who knew the art of war. Some like, Nathan Bedford Forrest, Lawrence Chamberlin or John B. Gordon learned on the job- in the field, while the Robert E. Lee’s and William T. Sherman’s learned their craft in a military academy. Understanding what generals were attempting to do on the battlefield makes a tour of Fort Donelson, Vicksburg or Manassas that much more interesting.